ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, 

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy.

Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte but was informed that office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, deadline already lapsed.

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila as well as her Answer to private respondent's petition. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

Second Division of (COMELEC), came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification  meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. Dealing with issue of petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement.

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

RULING:
NO.  It is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

BENGSON vs. HRET (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. 142840      May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, 

vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

According to him a natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING:

Yes. In this case, he repatriated.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, xxx

Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided which were complied with by the respondent.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, 

vs.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent

FACTS:

The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.  While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

RULING:

YES. To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is immediately executory.

MERCADO vs. MANZANO (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, 

vs.

EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati elections. The results of the election were in favor of Manzano wherein he got the highest number of votes. However, the proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under S40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. 

In his answer the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts he holds dual citizenship.

The Commission declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved instead COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati.

Commission en banc ruled that respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

And when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

Commission en banc REVERSED the resolution of the Second Division, hence petition.

ISSUE:

Whether dual citizenship is ground for disqualification.

RULING:

No.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. 

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. 

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

TECSON vs. COMELEC (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. 161434             March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, 

vs.

The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC, petitioner and respondent in support of their claim, presented several documentary exhibits.

The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit. Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on  by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

ISSUE:

Whether FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. (NOTE: for purposes of discussing conflict of laws only.)

RULING:

Yes.

In resolving the conflicting laws, the followings are important matter:

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands×××

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

---

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. However with the adoption of the 1935 Constitution only jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

The following are the proof that Jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

XXX (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. XXX

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

XXX (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. XXX

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

XXX (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines. XXX

In determining the citizenship of FPJ, it is imperative to determine the citizenship of his father Allan Poe and his grandparent Lorenzo Pou.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. 

The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the case.

GO vs. DIMAGIBA (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 151876               June 21, 2005

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.

FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 under separate Complaints filed with the (MTCC) in Baguio City.

After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision convicting the accused in the 13 cases and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum.

Dimagiba made an appeal but the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction. There being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.

Thus, MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.

Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. 

MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.

However he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition17 for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing.

RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.

In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. CA and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,22 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.

Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders but was denied.

Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the petition for writ of habeas was validly granted.

(2) Whether SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive effect on this case.

RULING:

(1) NO.

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.

While it js true that the petition was anchored with no. 3 exception, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC's Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.36 Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.

The court ruled that his Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.

(2) NO. 

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties. When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which respondent's conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent's Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

SENOJA vs. PEOPLE (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 160341             October 19, 2004

EXEQUIEL SENOJA, petitioner,

vs. 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

An Information was filed charging petitioner Exequiel Senoja with homicide, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on April 16, 1997 at around 11 o’clock in the morning in Barangay Zarah, San Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon the person of one Leon Lumasac by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon locally known as "kolonyal" at the different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

The petitioner admitted killing the victim but invoked the affirmative defense of self-defense. His version of the fatal incident is that according to him Leon Lumasac walked back to meet him and upon reaching him, the former suddenly and treacherously hacked the left side of his head and right thigh; because of unable to evade the treacherous attack by Leon Lumasac who persisted in his criminal design, Exequiel Senoja drew his "colonial" knife and stabbed Leon Lumasac in self-defense, inflicting upon him multiple wounds which caused his death.

Trial court rendered judgment against the petitioner, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 

In due course, the petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming, with modification, the decision of the RTC. The petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, contending that:

The Honorable Court of Appeals failed to appreciate vital facts which, if considered, would probably alter the result of this case on appeal finding appellant’s plea of self-defense credible.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused acted in self defense.

RULING:

No, The petition is denied.

Paragraph 1, Article 11, of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.

Considering the number, nature and location of the wounds sustained by the victim, the petitioner’s plea of self-defense is incredible.

The question that must be resolved is whether or not the victim was the unlawful aggressor as the appellant’s testimony pictures him to be. The Court rules in the negative. The victim had already left the hut and was ten (10) meters away from it. There is no showing that the victim, who was drunk, was aware that appellant was following him, or that the appellant called out to him so that he (the victim) had to turn around and notice him. It is clear that at that point in time, the victim was simply walking toward his home; he had stopped being an aggressor. It was the appellant who, smarting from the earlier incident in the hut where Leon told him "hindi ka tatagal, sa loob ng tatlong araw mayroong mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas" repeated three times, wanted a confrontation. Appellant stabbed or poked the victim in the left buttock resulting in the non-fatal wound, and when the latter turned around, successively stabbed and hacked the victim in the armpit and chest until he fell. In all, the victim suffered nine (9) wounds.

It is the well-considered finding of this Court that while Leon Lumasac had ceased being the aggressor after he left the hut to go home, accused Exequiel Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this second phase of their confrontation. It bears mentioning that appellant contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon and the second reason was that he was going home.

As for appellant’s injuries, it is clear that they were sustained in the course of the victim’s attempt to defend himself as shown by the lacerated wound on the victim’s left palm, a defensive wound.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.