TAYAG vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC. (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. L-23145      November 29, 1968

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,

vs.

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet Consolidated Inc., the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased. 

On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag.

A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question. 

On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. 

The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the order.

And on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] considered as lost."

After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby:

(1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc.,

(2) orders said certificates cancelled, and

(3) directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court."

From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]."

ISSUE:

Whether the order of the court is proper.

RULING:

YES.

Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors. 

As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is a "general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state or country."

The case of Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

The contention of Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..." Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.

BAGONG FILIPINAS OVERSEAS CORPORATION vs. NLRC (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. L-66006 February 28, 1985

BAGONG FILIPINAS OVERSEAS CORPORATION and GOLDEN STAR SHIPPING, LTD., petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, DIRECTOR PATRICIA SANTO TOMAS and PROSERFINA PANCHO respondents.

FACTS:

The shipboard employment contract dated was executed in this country between Pancho and Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation, the local agent of Golden Star Shipping. It was approved by the defunct National Seamen Board. Pancho was hired as an oiler in the M/V Olivine for 12 months with a gross monthly wage of US $195.

Pancho had a cerebral stroke. He was rushed to the hospital while the vessel was docked at Sweden. He was repatriated to the Philippines and confined at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. He died on December 13, 1979.

The National Seamen Board awarded his widow, Proserfina, P20,000 as disability compensation benefits pursuant to the above-mentioned employment contract plus P2,000 as attorney's fees. 

Proserfina appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which awarded her $621 times 36 months or its equivalent in Philippine currency plus 10% of the benefits as attorney's fees. Golden Star Shipping assailed that decision by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether the shipboard employment contract or Hongkong law should govern the amount of death compensation due to the wife of Guillermo Pancho who was employed by Golden Star Shipping, Ltd., a Hongkong based firm.

RULING:

We hold that the shipboard employment contract is controlling in this case. The contract provides that the beneficiaries of the seaman are entitled to P20,000 "over and above the benefits" for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine law.

Hongkong law on workmen's compensation is not the applicable law. The case of Norse Management Co. vs. National Seamen Board, G. R. No. 54204, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 486 cannot be a precedent because it was expressly stipulated in the employment contract in that case that the workmen's compensation payable to the employee should be in accordance with Philippine Law or the Workmen's Insurance Law of the country where the vessel is registered "whichever is greater".

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO vs. NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. L-54204 September 30, 1982

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.

FACTS:

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. 

In her complaint for "death compensation benefits, accrued leave pay and time-off allowances, funeral expenses, attorney's fees and other benefits and reliefs available in connection with the death of Napoleon B. Abordo," filed before the National Seamen Board, Restituta C. Abordo alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners Norse Management Co. (PTE) and Pacific Seamen Services, Inc., principal and agent, respectively, should be based on the law where the vessel is registered.

On the other hand, petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore. As an alternative, they offered to pay private respondent Restituta C. Abordo the sum of P30,000.00 as death benefits based on the Board's Memorandum Circular No. 25 which they claim should apply in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

RULING:

YES.

It is true that the law of Singapore was not alleged and proved in the course of the hearing. And following Supreme Court decisions in a long line of cases that a foreign law, being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, the law of Singapore ought not to be recognized in this case. But it is our considered opinion that the jurisprudence on this matter was never meant to apply to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies such as the National Seamen Board. For well-settled also is the rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound strictly by technical rules. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. We see no reason to deviate from this well-considered policy. Certainly not on technical grounds as movants herein would like us to.

Moreover, in the "Employment Agreement" between petitioners and the late Napoleon B. Abordo, it is clear that compensation shall be paid under Philippine Law or the law of registry of petitioners' vessel, whichever is greater. Since private respondent Restituta C. Abordo was offered P30,000.00 only by the petitioners, Singapore law was properly applied in this case.

Furthermore, Article 20, Labor Code of the Philippines, provides that the National Seamen Board has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment. Thus, it is safe to assume that the Board is familiar with pertinent Singapore maritime laws relative to workmen's compensation. Moreover, the Board may apply the rule on judicial notice and, "in administrative proceedings, the technical rules of procedure — particularly of evidence — applied in judicial trials, do not strictly apply.

Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

GAMBOA vs. TEVES (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. 176579               October 9, 2012

HEIRS OF WILSON P. GAMBOA,* Petitioners,

vs.

FINANCE SECRETARYMARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE UNDERSECRETARYJOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT(PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC ASSET HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, Respondents.

FACTS:

-Gamboa is stockholder of PLDT.

-PTIC became a stockholder of PLDT because it acquired the shares of GTE in PLDT.

-PHI acquired shares in PTIC and those shares number to 111kplus. Therefore PHI became stockholder of PTIC.

-And the stockholding of PHI number to 111kplus was sequestered by government through PCGG.

-The government of the republic of the Philippines is now the holder of such shares.

-The government wanted to sell the 111k shares. The winning bidder is certain company.

-However the government notified First Pacific because the First Pacific is another stockholder of PLDT. First pacific failed to exercise its right of first refusal. Therefore its affiliate Metropacific was the one who bought the shares. 

-Gamboa together with other stockholder of PLDT question the sale and pray for its nullity on the ground that the effect of the sale of government of shares in PTIC will operate as indirect sale of approximately 6% of PLDT shares to First Pacific which is a foreign corporation that owned as well another shares with PLDT of approximately 30.7%plus. If it will acquire those shares being sold by the government its shares will increase to approximately 37% plus shares.

-That having been said,

The first pacific will now 37.plus %

While other foreign corp owned shares as well with PLDT aside from First Pacific, below are the approximate computation:

37% fist pacific

20+% other stockholder

30+% japanese entity

Which is violative to constitutional prohibition that foreign corporation should not own more than 40% of shares.

ISSUE:

(1) Definition of word capital, whether it shall include only commom shares or the combination of preferred and common shares.

RULING:

Common shares only.

The Articles of incorporation of PLDT provides that preferred shares does not have voting right (in all meeting) while common shares has.

It is violative to Corporation Law. Par 6 Sec 6. which providees that common share has complete voting right on election of directors while preferred shares does not have right to vote for such. That preferred shares are entitled to vote par 6 sec 6 on those cases enumerated under par 6 sec 6 of Corporation Law.

AASIMID

The constitution provides under sec 11 art 12 that 60% of capital shall be owned by filipino and no foreigner shall own more than 40%.

Morever, the SC ruled that the term cap sec 11 art 12 refers only to common shares.

Dissenting opinion:

According to Justice Velasco. 

Preferred share has no complete voting right not totally no voting rights.

Par 6 sec 6 Corporation Law

Enumerste instances where preferred share are entitled to vote:

Amendment of art of inco

Adoption and amendment of by laws

Consolidation

Increase / decrease of capital stocks

Bonded indebtedness

Merger

Investment of own or substantially own corporate assets

Dissolution

Those are not negligable in fact it holds salient matters. Therefore they should be determine in compliance with 60/40 rule.

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. vs. CITIBANK (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. Nos. 79926-27 October 17, 1991

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., petitioners,

vs.

CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA, HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

The foreign banks involved in the controversy are Bank of America NT and SA, Citibank N.A. and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.  They jointly filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for involuntary insolvency of Consolidated Mines, Inc. (CMI), said CMI had obtained loans from the three petitioning bank. 

The petition was opposed om the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for insolvency because petitioners are not resident creditors of CMI in contemplation of the Insolvency Law.

ISSUE:

Whether foreign banks licensed to do business in the Philippines, may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" within the meaning of Section 20 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended, eff. May 20, 1909)

RULING:

There is no question that the three banks are foreign corporations in this sense, with principal offices situated outside of the Philippines. There is no question either that said banks have been licensed to do business in this country and have in fact been doing business here for many years, through branch offices or agencies, including "foreign currency deposit units;" 

The issue is whether these Philippine branches or units may be considered "residents of the Philippine Islands" as that term is used in Section 20 of the Insolvency Law, or residents of the state under the laws of which they were respectively incorporated. The answer cannot be found in the Insolvency Law itself, which contains no definition of the term, resident, or any clear indication of its meaning. There are however other statutes, albeit of subsequent enactment and effectivity, from which enlightening notions of the term may be derived. (NIRC and Corporation Law)

It is imperative to know the following:

DOMESTIC CORPORATION

The principal place of business is considered as the residence of domestic corporation. (Under remedial law, it is where summon must be served through the enumerated persons provided therein)

Corporation Law

FOREIGN CORPORATION

If entity is incorporated pursuant to laws other than those of the Philippines it is foreign entity.

But under Philippine jurisdiction

For as long as there is observance of the rule of RECIPROCITY wherein a Philippine corporation should also be allowed in another jurisdiction to do business therein then any corporation incorporated pursuant to laws of that foreign jurisdiction would be considered here as foreign corporation. 

In other words, an entity incorporated pursuant to laws other than those of the Philippines will be  considered as foreign corporation provided there is compliance with rule on reciprocity.

RECIPROCITY - meaning that other country under those whose laws the foreign entity was incorporated must also be affording the same privilege and benefits to Filipino citizens.

It will only be a foreign corporation if it is incorporated pursuant to laws of another jurisdiction subject to the rule on reciprocity.

If there is no reciprocity it is not a foreign corporation here it is nothing but foreign entity. Only foreign corporation is licensed to do business in the Philippines.

----

Domestic corporation is considered as domicile and resident in the Philippines. Whereas the domicile of foreign corporation is the place of incorporation.

Foreign corporation if it is domiciled in the place of incorporation may it considered as resident of the Philippines as far as the branches are concern?

The SC ruled in affirmative, on the ground that because foreign corporation is license to do business in the Philippines. And that foreign corporation does not only have principal place of business in that other jurisdiction but also it has branches or places of operations in different parts of the world. For that purpose therefore there becomes a distinction between domicile and residence as far as foreign corporation is concern.

Thus, if foreign corporation is deemed to be domicile in place of incorporation.

But if it is license to do business in Philippines. It has branch or branches or has operation as foreign corporation license to do business in Philippine. It shall be considered as resident foreign corporation.

How to serve summon to resident foreign corporation?

Answer: Through designated officer, the resident agent, he is fully authorized to receive summon. Service upon that resident agent is deemed as service upon the foreign corporation. Absence of which it may be served to designated government agencies. Like, Foreign bank to BSP; Insurance Corporation to Insurance Commission; any other corporation to SEC.

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. vs. CA and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC. (Conflict of Laws)

G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Northwest Airlines and defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its Japan branch, entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff under the said agreement, plaintiff sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for damages.

A writ of summons was issued by the Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan against defendant at its office at the Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons was unsuccessful. After the two attempts of service were unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at the head office of the defendant in Manila. Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels upon the defendant's head office in Manila.

The defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons. Despite receipt of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and on rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay. 

Then, the defendant received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment. Defendant not having appealed the judgment, the same became final and executory.

The defendant assailed the validity of service of summon.

ISSUE:

Whether service of summon to a resident corporation conferring to philippine jurisdiction may be made through diplomatic channels.

RULING:

YES, SC held that summon may be done by preference through personal service but substituted service of summon must be recognized as well. Resident corporation must have authorized representative here, duly authorized by that foreign corporation license to do business in the philippines to receive or accept summon on behalf of foreign entity. SC said that the service of summon being done properly by diplomatic channel then the service is valid therefore any judgment rendered pursuant to that valid service of summon is a valid judgment hence can enforce in its jurisdiction.

NEPOMUCENO vs. CA (Succession)

G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO, respondents.

FACTS:

Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.

The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance.

Legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner.

The respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court.

ISSUE:

(1)Whether the devise in favor of concubine is valid.

(2)Whether the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

RULING:

(1) No. It is prohibited under Article 739 of the Civil Code, such is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

(2) No. While it is true that the general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will, such are the testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. 

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

IBP vs. ZAMORA (Constitutional Law Review)

G.R. No. 141284               August 15, 2000

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, President Estrada directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence.

In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief formulated Letter of Instruction 02/20001 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional on the ground that no emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of the military to assist the police force.

Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

RULING:

NO. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. The IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.

The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court’s duty of "purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.

The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. 

Hence, petition is dismissed.

LIBAN vs. GORDON (Constitutional Law Review)

[G.R. NO. 175352 : July 15, 2009]

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners, v. RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners Dante V. Liban among others are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter. They filed a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon who is a Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. 

Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. 

Respondent insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is a taxpayer's suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue which is of transcendental importance.

ISSUE:

Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:

PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions.

President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95, otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.

The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention.

The PNRC is a member National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement). To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. 

The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Philippine Government.

Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water Districts, the elements of government ownership and control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership and control by the government.

In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,28 2,29 3,30 4(a),31 5,32 6,33 7,34 8,35 9,36 10,37 11,38 12,39 and 1340 of the PNRC Charter, as amended, are void.

In sum, SC held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

WHEREFORE, it was declared that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

MEDINA vs. KOIKE (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore two children.

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents to support the petition.

However RTC denied Doreen's petition.

Doreen's motion for reconsideration was denied as well, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

RULING:

It bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

In one of the jurisprudence it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. 

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.

REPUBLIC vs. MANALO (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. 

OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.

OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether, under Art 26 par 2 of Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. 

RULING:

SC deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

SC affirmed CA decision regarding:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. 

--------

(SC denied the petition and remanded it for futher proceedings. See ruling below.

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,

vs.

LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents

FACTS:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and RTC. It was granted, now the respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari on the ground of among others that the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether habeas corpus is proper remedy in this case.

RULING:
YES. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9  of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ELCANO vs HILL (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, 

vs.

REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

ISSUE:

Is the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has extinguished his liability for quasi-delict.

RULING:

No, the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Here is a clear instance of the act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. 

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under Quasi Delicts/Culpa Aquiliana is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",

Notably, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.

IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA (Civil Law Review 1)

[G.R. NO. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA 

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner.

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

The trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.

WHEREFORE, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

RULING:

YES. 

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.

REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in this case will prosper on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No, psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The following are the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. 

Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. 

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. 

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS (Criminal Law)

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992.

Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. 

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

ISSUE:

Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

RULING:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. 

The following are the rules:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

ROMUALDEZ vs. CA (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. Nos. 165510-33             July 28, 2006

BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.

RULING:

Yes. 

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.21

Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that:

It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23

Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.

As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

BATULANON vs. PEOPLE (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. No. 139857             September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner, 

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

Leonila Batulanon is Cashier/Manager of Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit. 

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors. 

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition. 

ISSUE: 

Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents. 

RULING:

Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. 

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. SC finds that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. 

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

PEOPLE vs. TABACO (Criminal Law)

People v. Tabaco

G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena while the  accused Mario Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated when he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of  Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co’s canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. He tried to pacify Tabaco. Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo,one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena, and saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena.  They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints.”

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts.

ISSUES:

Whether the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.

RULING:

No.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

‘When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).

Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses.”

Furthermore, the trial court’s reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.