PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TURINGAN (Evidence)

[G.R. No. 121628. December 4, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TURINGAN

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rex Turingan and his co-accused, Efren Turingan, were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. When respectively arraigned, both accused entered a plea of not guilty. During trial, prosecution presented 10 witnesses. One of the arguments of appellant is that he insists that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Francisco Accad, Alfonso Gorospe, Lito Mabazza and Allan Miramonte cannot be relied upon as evidence to sustain his conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether the court erred in relying upon the testimonies of Francisco Accad, Alfonso Gorospe and Lito Mabazza in convicting the accused-appellant;

RULING:

No, Francisco Accad executed a sworn statement before the Regional Command of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, narrating in detail how the incident happened and identifying Rex Turingan as the one who shot Benjamin Cortez. 

Francisco Accad reiterated the abovementioned facts in his sworn statement executed during the preliminary investigation conducted by Judge Estela B. Lucas of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. However, during his testimony in the trial court, although he identified the sworn statement and admitted that he executed and signed the same, he alleged that he was forced and tortured to do so. He repudiated what were stated in his sworn statement and claimed that he did not actually witness the killing of Benjamin Cortez because he was then in the cornfields, about 100 meters away, harvesting young corn.

Considering that there are two sets of diametrically contradictory statements made by Francisco Accad, it is the stand of appellant that all the statements made by this witness cannot have any evidentiary or probative value. Withal, although as a rule testimonial evidence carries more weight than affidavits and substantial contradictions between the affidavit and the testimony on the witness stand discredit the witness, the peculiar but obvious circumstances on this particular aspect in the case compel us to rule otherwise.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate his original testimony if credible. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.

Incidentally, even if we were to exclude the sworn statement of Francisco Accad, the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses are sufficient in law and convincing in substance to sustain appellants conviction.

Bachrach Motors v CIR 86 SCRA 27 (EVIDENCE)

Bachrach Motors v CIR 86 SCRA 27

FACTS:

Petitioner Bachrach Motor Co., then known as Rural Transit had a pending labor dispute with its employees before the CIR. During the pendency of the case, petitioner filed a “Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from the service”, alleging that said driver violated the Motor Vehicle Law resulting to damage to property and injuries to third parties. In an Answer and Counter- Petition filed by the employees’ association in behalf of Jacob, the allegations were denied and it was averred that the cause of the accident was a mechanical defect. The petition was heard during which petitioner only presented one witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin. Mr. Kaplin was set to appear again for cross-examination but failed to do as he already left for abroad. The employees’ association filed a motion praying that the testimony be stricken from the records and that the petition to dismiss Jacob be denied and that he be reinstated with backwages. The CIR granted the motion and dismissed the company’s petition and ordered Jacob’s reinstatement.

ISSUE:

Whether the CIR erred in striking out Kaplin’s testimony.

RULING: 

NO. The Court cited a number of cases in upholding the CIR’s decision.

In Savory Luncheonette v Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino: The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which is part of due process.

In Ortigas Jr. v Lufthansa German Airlnes: when cross- examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. Until such cross-examination has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case.

REPUBLIC vs REGISTER OF DEEDS (Special Proceedings)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 158230

FACTS:

Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from  Dinglasan siblings. Lee Liong died intestate and was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting. The surviving heirs of Lee Liong extrajudicially settled the estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No. 398. When Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth) and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita) who are Filipino citizens.

ISSUE:

Whether Lot No. 398 can be subject of escheat.

RULING:

No, Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified party.

Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents who are Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence, reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of Filipino citizens.

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN (Special Proceedings)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

- versus -

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 166676

FACTS:

Petitioner alleged that she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.

Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The RTC granted respondents petition. RTC said that petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling. The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC (Special Proceedings)

G.R. No. 174689             October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO,petitioner, 

vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

RULING:

The RTC granted the petition and is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. However, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's petition, set aside the decision of the RTC and ordered the dismissal of the case. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.

A change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo (EVIDENCE)

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo

GR No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Facts:

Raymond and Reynaldo were taken by some members of the CAFGU. They were interrogated and beaten up several times. After detention of more than one year, Raymond and Reynaldo were able to escape. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, and temporary restraining order against the petitioners. In the meantime and while the petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated. The Court then resolved to treat the petition as a petition for a writ of amparo. Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit. Jimenez found that the participation of the petitioners in the abduction and disappearance of the Manalo brothers were unsubstantiated.

Issue:

Whether Manalo Brothers entitled to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Ruling:

Yes, the privilege of writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fear and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
This case delineates as well the meaning of enforced disappearances which are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government, the refusal of the state to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

ARTHUR F. MORALES vs. LEONCIA REAL-DIMAGIBA, JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, AND RAMON R. GARCIA (PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS)

ARTHUR F. MORALES I, Complainant, v. LEONCIA REAL-DIMAGIBA, JHOSEP Y. LOPEZ, AND RAMON R. GARCIA, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, FIFTEENTH DIVISION, COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, 

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the complaint filed by Arthur F. Morales I (complainant) charging Associate Justices Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, Jhosep Y. Lopez, and Ramon R. Garcia, all of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA), with gross ignorance of the law, procedure and jurisprudence, rendering them unfit to perform their judicial functions.

The facts are, A fire razed the warehouse of Kentex Marketing Corporation (Kentex), incident caused the death of not less than seventy-four (74) employees of Kentex.

Investigation conducted after the incident revealed that Valenzuela City Mayor Rexlon T. Gatchalian (Mayor Gatchalian) issued a mayor's permit to Kentex without requiring the latter to submit a Fire Safety Inspection Certificate (FSIC), in violation of the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 9514).

Criminal and Administrative complaints were thereafter filed against Mayor Gatchalian before the Office of the Ombudsman.

In a Joint Resolution dated 11 February 2016, the OMB found Mayor Gatchalian, among others, guilty of grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty and were meted the penalty of dismissal from the service with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits and privileges and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Mayor Gatchalian assailed the OMB ruling before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 144428 entitled "Rexlon T. Gatchalian v. Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al." and raffled to the Fifteenth Division. of the CA.

The Fifteenth Division of the CA issued a resolutio that let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued.

Fearing that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction would follow, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent associate justices of the Fifteenth Division of the CA.

Complainant maintained that the Joint Resolution of the OMB involving the dismissal from the service of Mayor Gatchalian cannot be enjoined by a TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction of the CA. He averred that the TRO issued by the respondent associate justices on 4 March 2016 was a direct contravention of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in Facura v. CA⁴ and Villaseñor, et al. Complainant implores this Court to dismiss the respondent associate justices from the judiciary for grave ignorance of the law and jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
Whether Associate Justice guilty of ignorance of law and jurisprudence thus be dismissed?

RULING:
It is clear that the assailed resolutions were issued by respondent justices in the proper exercise of their judicial functions. As such, these are not subject to administrative disciplinary action. Other than complainant's bare allegations, there were no evidence presented to show any wrong-doings or bad faith on the part of respondent justices. We have settled the rule that a judge may not be administratively sanctioned from mere errors of judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, fraud, malice, gross ignorance, corrupt purpose, or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his or her part.¹² Judicial officers cannot be subjected to administrative disciplinary actions for their performance of duty in good faith.

In order to be held administratively liable it must be shown that the respondent associate justices have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.¹⁷ No such ill motivation was shown, nay alleged, to have caused the issuance of the TRO.

PEOPLE vs PUESCA (EVIDENCE)

  

G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON. VICENTE N. CUSIJR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIOPUESCA

alias

Big Boy, WALTER APA, JOSE GUSTILO

alias

Peping,FILOMENO MACALINAO, JR.

alias

White, RICARDO DAIRO alias Carding,and MAGNO MONTANO

alias

Edol, respondents.

DIZON,

J.:

FACTS:

Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty.

While Sgt. Bano was testifying as prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone of them.

The prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators.

Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this,upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned.

ISSUE: Should Sgt. Bano have been allowed to answer the question in full?

RULING:

YES, Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted.

But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon).

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca.

The question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM (SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS)

IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93

ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.

LIM, Present:

MONINA P. LIM, PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

Petitioner. CARPIO,

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x CORONA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.

ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE

P. LIM,

Promulgated:

MONINA P. LIM,

Petitioner. May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.  Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.  Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

RULING:

No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the following cases: 

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or 

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or 

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in the case at bar. 

The use of the word “shall” means that  joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.