PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TURINGAN (Evidence)

[G.R. No. 121628. December 4, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TURINGAN

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Rex Turingan and his co-accused, Efren Turingan, were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. When respectively arraigned, both accused entered a plea of not guilty. During trial, prosecution presented 10 witnesses. One of the arguments of appellant is that he insists that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Francisco Accad, Alfonso Gorospe, Lito Mabazza and Allan Miramonte cannot be relied upon as evidence to sustain his conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether the court erred in relying upon the testimonies of Francisco Accad, Alfonso Gorospe and Lito Mabazza in convicting the accused-appellant;

RULING:

No, Francisco Accad executed a sworn statement before the Regional Command of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, narrating in detail how the incident happened and identifying Rex Turingan as the one who shot Benjamin Cortez. 

Francisco Accad reiterated the abovementioned facts in his sworn statement executed during the preliminary investigation conducted by Judge Estela B. Lucas of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. However, during his testimony in the trial court, although he identified the sworn statement and admitted that he executed and signed the same, he alleged that he was forced and tortured to do so. He repudiated what were stated in his sworn statement and claimed that he did not actually witness the killing of Benjamin Cortez because he was then in the cornfields, about 100 meters away, harvesting young corn.

Considering that there are two sets of diametrically contradictory statements made by Francisco Accad, it is the stand of appellant that all the statements made by this witness cannot have any evidentiary or probative value. Withal, although as a rule testimonial evidence carries more weight than affidavits and substantial contradictions between the affidavit and the testimony on the witness stand discredit the witness, the peculiar but obvious circumstances on this particular aspect in the case compel us to rule otherwise.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate his original testimony if credible. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence.

Incidentally, even if we were to exclude the sworn statement of Francisco Accad, the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses are sufficient in law and convincing in substance to sustain appellants conviction.