PEOPLE vs. ACBANGIN (Criminal Law 1 Review)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOCELYN ACBANGIN y RADAM, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

April 23, 1991 Danilo Acbangin was worried when his daughter, four-year old Sweet Grace Acbangin (hereinafter referred to as "Sweet") did not come home.

Sweet's father, Danilo, testified that he last saw Sweet on the same day, at six o'clock in the evening, playing in Jocelyn's house. Jocelyn was the common‑law wife of his second cousin, Remy Acbangin.

Danilo went to Jocelyn's house and looked for Sweet. There was no one there. 

At around seven fifteen in the evening, Danilo reported to the Barangay and the Bacoor Police Station that Sweet was missing.

On the same day at eleven o'clock in the evening, Jocelyn arrived at Danilo's house without Sweet. When asked where the child was, Jocelyn denied knowing of the child's whereabouts.

On April 24, 1991, Danilo made a second report to the Bacoor Police Station, stating that Jocelyn returned without the child.

On April 24, 1991, Jocelyn informed Danilo's mother-in-law that Sweet was in Niu's house in Tondo, Manila.

Jocelyn personally knew Niu and was first to enter the house. Jocelyn went up to the second floor of the house. She went down with Niu and Sweet. Sweet was well-dressed and smiling. She ran to her father and embraced him. Niu then voluntarily turned Sweet over to her father and the policemen.[

ISSUE:

Whether the recommendation of executive clemency will prosper.

RULING:

YES.

Sweet's testimony, stating that it was Jocelyn who brought her to Niu's house, should not be disregarded. Section 20, Rule 134 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that, "All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others may be witnesses." A witness' young age will not deter him or her from being a competent and credible witness. To be a competent child witness, the following criteria must be met: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection and (c) capacity of communication.[31 All these were met by Sweet. Besides, the trial court's assessment of Sweet's credibility should be upheld and respected since its assessment was not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of any material fact.[32

Burdensome and harsh as it may be, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. True, Sweet was not maltreated. True also, that at the time of the crime, Jocelyn was only 21 years old. However, the crime as defined by law was committed. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh, but it is the law.

We agree with the trial court that a strict application of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code would be too harsh, taking into consideration the minimal injury caused by the offense. We agree that the accused be recommended to the Chief Executive for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, dated June 22, 1994, finding accused‑appellant JOCELYN RADAM ACBANGINguilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code,[33 we recommend to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice, the grant to accused-appellant JOCELYN RADAM ACBANGINof either a commutation of sentence to an indeterminate penalty of prision correctional to prision mayor or executive clemency, considering that she has been in preventive detention since April 29, 1991.[34 Let a copy of this decision be forwarded to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, through the Secretary of Justice.

PEOPLE vs. MONLEON (Criminal Law 1 Review)

G.R. No. L-36282 December 10, 1976

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

COSME MONLEON, accused-appellant.

Prospero A. Crescini, for appellant.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero for appellee.

FACTS:

Cosme Monleon arrived at his house. He was drunk. He inquired from Concordia whether their carabao had been fed by their ten-year old son, Marciano. She assured him that the carabao had been fed. He repaired to the place where the carabao was tethered to check the veracity of her statement. He discovered that the carabao had not been adequately fed. He became furious.

When he was about to whip Marciano, Concordia intervened. A violent quarrel ensued between them. He placed himself astride his wife's chest, squezzed her neck, pressed her head against a post, and kicked her in the abdomen.

Felicisimo, one of the couple's six children, pulled away his father and stopped his assault on Concordia.

The following morning Concordia vomitted blood. She died at eleven o'clock on that morning of June 2. Death was due to "acute abdomen" (Exh. B), a pathologic condition within the belly, requiring surgical intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether recommendation of executive clemency will prosper.

RULING:

YES.

The Solicitor General is correct in finding that the extenuating circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and intoxication, which was not habitual, are present in this case. Hence, the penalty imposable on Monleon is reclusion perpetua (Arts. 63[3] and 246, Revised Penal Code).

But considering that Monleon had no intent to kill his wife and that her death might have been hastened by lack of appropriate medical attendance or her weak constitution, the penalty of reclusion perpetua appears to be excessive. A strict enforcement of the provisions of the Penal Code means the imposition of a draconian penalty on Monleon.

Therefore, there is sufficient justification for the Solicitor General's recommendation that Monleon's case be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive so that the penalty of reclusion perpetua may be reduced.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Pursuant to article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, a certified copy of this decision should be furnished the Chief Executive through the Secretary of Justice.

Tanada vs Angara (Political Law Review)

TANADA vs. ANGARA GR NO. 118295

FACTS:

On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by its Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the Final Act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate to ratify the WTO Agreement.

This is a petition assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”

The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS (Political Law Review)

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156 | February 3, 1997

FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”

ISSUES:

Whether or not Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.

Whether or not Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony.

RULING:

Article XII, Section 10, par. 2 of the Constitution is self-executing.

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.

Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.  When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Other matters discussed: Doctrine of constitutional supremacy

Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

DUENAS vs HRET (Political Law Review)

.R. No. 185401               July 21, 2009

HENRY "JUN" DUEÑAS, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes were rival candidates for the position of congressman in the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. After the canvass of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed the winner, having garnered 28,564 votes as opposed to private respondent’s 27,107 votes.  Not conceding defeat, private respondent filed an election protest, praying for a revision/recount, alleging that he was cheated in the protested 170 of 732 precincts through insidious and well-orchestrated electoral frauds and anomalies which resulted in the systematic reduction of his votes and the corresponding increase in petitioner’s votes.

In an order dated September 25, 2008, the HRET directed the continuation of the revision and appreciation of the remaining 75% of the counter-protested precincts pursuant to Rule 88 of the HRET Rules.  Instead of complying with the order, petitioner filed an urgent motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts on October 27, 2008. This was denied by the HRET, reiterating its order directing the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts and recalling its order requiring petitioner to augment his cash deposit. The Tribunal instead ordered the use of its own funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

On November 27, 2008, the HRET issued a resolution under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence, ruling that it had the discretion either to dismiss the protest or counter-protest, or to continue with the revision if necessitated by reasonable and sufficient grounds affecting the validity of the election.  This was with the end in view of ascertaining the true choice of the electorate. It was the HRET’s position that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw/abandon the unrevised precincts did not automatically divest the HRET of its jurisdiction over the same. Moreover, it ruled that its task of determining the true will of the electorate was not confined to the examination of contested ballots. Under its plenary power, it could motu propio review the validity of every ballot involved in a protest or counter-protest and the same could not be frustrated by the mere expedient of filing a motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining counter-protested precincts. Convinced that it could not determine the true will of the electorate of the 2nd legislative district of Taguig City on the basis alone of the initial revision of the 100% protested precincts and the 25% counter-protested precincts, it had no other recourse but to continue the revision and appreciation of all the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts.

 ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not HRET’s assumption of the burden of the costs of the continued revision amounted to an illegal and unconstitutional disbursement of public funds nder Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.

(2) HRET’s Discretion to Use Its Own Funds in Revision Proceedings

When  jurisdiction  is  conferred  by  law  on  a  court  or tribunal, that court or tribunal, unless otherwise provided by law, is deemed to have the authority to employ all writs, processes and other means to make its power effective. Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. Since the HRET possessed the authority to motu propio continue a revision of ballots, it also had the wherewithal to carry it out. It thus ordered the disbursement of its own funds for the revision of the ballots in the remaining counter-protested precincts. We hark back to Rule 7 of the HRET Rules which provides that the HRET has exclusive control, direction and supervision of its functions. The HRET’s order was but one aspect of its power.

Moreover, Rule 8 of the HRET Rules provides that the Tribunal shall have and exercise all such powers as are vested in it by the Constitution or by law, and such other powers as are necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its purposes and functions as set forth in the Constitution or as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)

Certainly, the HRET’s order that its own funds be used for the revision of the ballots from the 75% counter-protested precincts was an exercise of a power necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of its primary function as sole judge of election protest cases involving its members. 

First, if petitioner hypothetically admits that the HRET has the power to order the continuation of the revision of the 75% remaining counter-protested precincts, then he should also necessarily concede that there is nothing to prevent the HRET from using its own funds to carry out such objective. Otherwise, the existence of such power on the part of the HRET becomes useless and meaningless.

Second,  Section 1, Chapter 1 of RA 9498 provides that the HRET has an allotted budget for the “Adjudication of Electoral Contests Involving Members of the House of Representatives.” The provision is general and encompassing enough to authorize the use of the HRET’s funds for the revision of ballots, whether in a protest or counter-protest. Being allowed by law, the use of HRET funds for the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts was not illegal, much less violative of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.  To reiterate, the law (particularly RA 9498) itself has appropriated funds for adjudicating election contests in the HRET. As an independent constitutional body, and having received the proper appropriation for that purpose, the HRET had wide discretion in the disbursement and allocation of such funds.

Third, HRET ha[s] the inherent power to suspend its own rules and disburse its funds for any lawful purpose it deemed best. This is specially significant in election contests such as this where what is at stake is the vital public interest in determining the true will of the electorate. In any event, nothing prevented the HRET from ordering any of the parties to make the additional required deposit(s) to cover costs, as respondent in fact manifested in the HRET.   Such disbursement could not be deemed a giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to a party since the benefit would actually redound to the electorate whose true will must be determined. Suffrage is a matter of public, not private, interest. The Court declared in Aruelo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that “[o]ver and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people.” Thus, in an election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be incidental.

All told, it should be borne in mind that the present petition is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It alleges that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008. But what is “grave abuse of discretion?” It is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Using the foregoing as yardstick, the Court finds that petitioner miserably failed to discharge the onus probandi imposed on him.

BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPINE TRUTH COMMISSION (Political Law Review)

G.R. No. 192935               December 7, 2010

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, 

vs.

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

FACTS:

Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

ISSUE: 

Whether EO No. 1 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

TAWAG MULTI PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDD WATER DITRICT (Political Law Review)

TAWAG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner, v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.

FACTS:

On 9 October 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local water utility, opposed TMPC's application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive.

The NWRB approved TMPC's application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD's franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. The RTC set aside the NWRB's decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC, stating that "the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee shall be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the ultimate authority of the State."

ISSUE: Whether or not an exclusive franchise is allowed

HELD:

No, The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions (the latter in Section 11, Article XII) expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character.When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. 

Indeed, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character.

In PD No. 198, as amended, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) created indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by allowing the BOD of LTWD and the LWUA to create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD No. 198 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency xxxunless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents thereto xxx subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.

In case of conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution always prevails because the Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws must conform to. The duty of the Court is to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws that do not conform to it.

GUTIERREZ vs. HR COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE (Political Law Review)

G.R. No. 193459               March 8, 2011

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE, CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.

FACTS:

22July2010: private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden Bello and Arlene Bag-ao

July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business

3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño, Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus

HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business

11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form

2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published

After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance.

Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings

ISSUES:

Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the Constitution

RULING:

DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?

–          (P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the HCOJ’s, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan

–          Presumption of regularity

–          The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule-making power in the HOR

–          the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or resolution”, and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee”

–          The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the Rules.

–          impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.

To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word "promulgate," it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of "to make known" as it should be generally understood.

Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations12 where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication of rules of procedure pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation. If the Constitution warranted the publication of Impeachment Rules, then it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it did in the case of legislative inquiries.

The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…" She insists that the Committee, after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period within which to finish its business.

CHAVES vs. JBC (Political Law Review)

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Sec 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress.

ISSUES:

1. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

2. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?

RULING:

1. YES, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

2. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs. SEC. REYES (Poitical Law Review)

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Secretary Angelo Reyes

FACTS:

Two sets of petitioners filed separate cases challenging the legality of Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) awarded to Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX).   The service contract allowed JAPEX to conduct oil exploration in the Tañon Strait during which it performed seismic surveys and drilled one exploration well.  The first petition was brought on behalf of resident marine mammals in the Tañon Strait by two individuals acting as legal guardians and stewards of the marine mammals.  The second petition was filed by a non-governmental organization representing the interests of fisherfolk, along with individual representatives from fishing communities impacted by the oil exploration activities. The petitioners filed their cases in 2007, shortly after JAPEX began drilling in the strait. 

ISSUE:

Whether the service contract violated the Philippine Constitution or other domestic laws. 

RULING:

The Court then held that while SC-46 was authorized Presidential Decree No. 87 on oil extraction, the contract did not fulfill two additional constitutional requirements.  Section 2 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires a service contract for oil exploration and extraction to be signed by the president and reported to congress.  Because the JAPEX contract was executed solely by the Energy Secretary, and not reported to the Philippine congress, the Court held that it was unconstitutional. Id., pp. 24-25.

In addition, the Court also ruled that the contract violated the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), which generally prohibits exploitation of natural resources in protected areas.  In order to explore for resources in a protected area, the exploration must be performed in accordance with an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The Court noted that JAPEX started the seismic surveys before any EIA was performed; therefore its activity was unlawful. Id., pp. 33-34.  Furthermore, the Tanon Strait is a NIPAS area, and exploration and utilization of energy resources can only be authorized through a law passed by the Philippine Congress. Because Congress had not specifically authorized the activity in Tañon Strait, the Court declared that no energy exploration should be permitted in that area. 

I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of environmental laws protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

MUSNIT vs. SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 182623               December 4, 2009 DIONISIO M. MUSNIT, Petitioner, 

vs.

SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION and SEA STAR SHIPPING CORPORATION, LTD.,Respondents.

FACTS:

Dionisio M. Musnit is chief cook on board the vessel M/V Navajo Princess.

Before his contract expired, petitioner, sometime in August 2002, while on board the vessel, felt a throbbing pain in his chest and shortening of breath which made him feel as if he were about to fall. By his claim, he reported his condition to his officer who ignored it, however. As the pain persisted, he resorted to pain relievers.

Upon completion of his contract, petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines on October 31, 2002 following which he, again by his claim, immediately reported to Sea Star's office and informed it of his condition, but that he was never referred to a doctor for consultation.6

Seven months after his repatriation, petitioner sought re-employment with Sea Star. During his pre-employment medical examination on May 26, 2003 at the American Outpatient Clinic, petitioner was diagnosed with "error of refraction, hyperglycemia, cardiac dysrhythmia, and atrial fibrillation with rapid value response"7 on account of which he was declared unfit for sea duties and was denied further deployment.

Petitioner underwent further medical examination but still declared him unfit to board ship and work as a seaman in any capacity. 

Petitioner thereupon lodged a claim for disability benefits from Sea Star which denied the same, however, drawing him to file a complaint against it, for Medical Reimbursement, Sickness Allowance, Permanent Disability Benefits, Compensatory Damages, Moral Damages, Exemplary Damages, and Attorney's fees.

ISSUE:

Whether Musnit is entitled for relief sought.

RULING:

NO.

Section 20(B) provides for the liabilities of the employer only when the seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment.34

Petitioner claims to have reported his illness to an officer once on board the vessel during the course of his employment.35 The records are bereft, however, of any documentary proof that he had indeed referred his illness to a nurse or doctor in order to avail of proper treatment. It thus becomes apparent that he was repatriated to the Philippines, not on account of any illness or injury, but in view of the completion of his contract.

But even assuming that petitioner was repatriated for medical reasons, he failed to submit himself to the company-designated doctor in accordance with the post-employment medical examination requirement under the above-quoted paragraph 3 of Section 20(B) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Failure to comply with this requirement which is a sine qua non bars the filing of claim for disability benefits.36

All told, the rule is that under Section 20-B(3) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, it is mandatory for a claimant to be examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits.37 (emphasis and underscoring supplied).

ABANTE vs. KJGS (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 182430               December 4, 2009 LEOPOLDO ABANTE, Petitioner, 

vs.

KJGS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA and/or GUY DOMINGO A. MACAPAYAG, KRISTIAN GERHARD JEBSENS SKIPSRENDERI A/S,Respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in June, 2000, while carrying equipment on board the vessel, petitioner slipped and hurt his back, petitioner was brought to a hospital whereupon he was diagnosed to be suffering from "lower back pain r/o old fracture lesion 4th lumbar body." Nevertheless, he was still declared to be fit for restricted work and was advised to see another doctor in the next port of call. Unable to bear the pain, petitioner was, on his request, repatriated to the Philippines on July 19, 2000.

On July 21, 2000, petitioner reported to KJGS and was referred to a company-designated physician, Dr. Roberto D. Lim (Dr. Lim), at the Metropolitan Hospital. After a series of tests, he was diagnosed to be suffering from "Foraminal stenosis L3-L14 and central disc protrusion L4-L5" on account of which he underwent Laminectomy and Discectomy on August 18, 2000, the cost of which was borne by KJGS. He was discharged from the hospital 10 days later, but was advised to continue physical therapy. He was seen by Dr. Lim around 10 times from the time he was discharged until February 20, 2001 when he was pronounced fit to resume sea duties. He, however, refused to sign his Certificate of Fitness for Work.

Petitioner later sought the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Jocelyn Myra R. Caja, who diagnosed him to have "failed back syndrome" and gave a grade 6 disability rating --- which rating rendered him medically unfit to work again as a seaman and called for the award of US$25,000.00 disability benefits --- drawing him to file on April 27, 2001 a Complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), for disability compensation in the amount of US$25,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether Abante is entitled to disability benefits.

RULING:
Yes,
Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract of 2000 provides:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY AND ILLNESS

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

x x x x

3. Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the above provision does not preclude the seafarer from getting a second opinion as to his condition for purposes of claiming disability benefits.

In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioner immediately consulted with a physician of his choice after initially having been seen and operated on by a company-designated physician. It was after he got a second opinion and a finding that he is unfit for further work as a seaman that he filed the claim for disability benefits.

INC. SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC vs. MORADAS (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 178564               January 15, 2014 INC. SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC., CAPTAIN SIGFREDO E. MONTERROYO AND/OR INTERORIENT NAVIGATION LIMITED, Petitioners,

vs.

ALEXANDER L. MORADAS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Moradas was employed as wiper for the vessel MV Commander (vessel) by peINC Shipmanagement, Inc. for its principal, petitionrrdInterorient Navigation, Ltd. (petitioners), for a period of 10 months, with a basic monthly salary of US 360.00, plus benefits.

On October 13, 2000, respondent claimed that while he was disposing of the garbage in the incinerator room of the vessel, certain chemicals splashed all over his body because of an explosion.5 He was sent to the Burns Unit of the Prince of Wales Hospital on the same day wherein he was found to have suffered deep burns. Eventually, upon his own request, respondent was sent home.6

On October 21, 2000, he was admitted to the St. Luke’s Medical Center.7 Subsequently, he was diagnosed to have sustained "thermal burns, upper and lower extremities and abdomen, 2º-3º, 11%"8 for which he underwent debridement. He was referred to a physical therapist for his subsequent debridement through hydrotherapy. On November 10, 2000, the attending physician, Dr. Natalio G. Alegre II, reported that the respondent’s thermal burns were healing well and that they were estimated to fully heal within a period of 3 to 4 months.9

Claiming that the burns rendered him permanently incapable of working again as a seaman, respondent demanded10 for the payment of his full disability benefits under Section 20 (B) in relation to Sections 30 and 30-A of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).

Petitioners denied respondent’s claims, contending that his injury was self-inflicted and, hence, not compensable under Section 20 (D) of the POEA-SEC. They denied that the vessel’s incinerator exploded and claimed that respondent burned himself by pouring paint thinner on his overalls and thereafter set himself on fire. They averred that he was led to commit such act after he was caught last October 10, 200013 stealing the vessel’s supplies during a routine security inspection conducted by Captain Bodo Wirth (Captain Wirth) where respondent was informed that he was to be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent is liable for disability benefits.

RULING:

YES.

The prevailing rule under Section 20 (B) of the 1996 POEA-SEC on compensation and benefits for injury or illness was that an employer shall be liable for the injury or illness suffered by a seafarer during the term of his contract. There was no need to show that such injury was work-related except that it must be proven to have been contracted during the term of the contract. The rule, however, is not absolute and the employer may be exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the cause of the seaman’s injury was directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act as provided under Section 20 (D) thereof, to wit:

D. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act, provided however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to seafarer.

In the case at bench, it was established through evidence that the injury of Moradas was not self inflicted.

PEOPLE vs. COMIA (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 109761 September 1, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

CARMELITA PUERTOLLANO COMIA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

FACTS:

For falsely representing herself to have the capacity and power to contract, enlist, and recruit workers for employment abroad, Carmelita Puertollano Comia was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 38, in relation to paragraph (a) of Article 39, of the Labor Code. The information 1 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

RULING:
YES.
Article 38 of the Labor Code provides in part as follows:

Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officers may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

Article 13(b) of the same Code defines recruitment as follows:

Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that there is illegal recruitment in large scale when a person (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

In this case, the presence of the second and third elements is beyond dispute. That the accused is not authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers is evidenced by a certification of the said agency dated 1 October 1991. In fact, to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties duly stipulated on the due issuance, authenticity, and truth of the said certification. There are no less than four complainants who patiently endured the rigors of trial to denounce the accused and expose her illegal recruitment activities.

Proffered to satisfy the first element of the crime were the testimonies of the complainants pointing to the accused as the person who promised them employment abroad and who collected and received various amounts from them.

PEOPLE vs. NOQUE (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 97845 September 29, 1994 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

NELIA CORONACION y NOQUE and EDUARDO AQUINO y AQUINO, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant Eduardo Aquino.

Roco, Buñag, Kapunan & Migallos for accused-appellant Nelia Coronacion.

FACTS:

That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised between June 18, 1987 and July 5, 1987, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement in Saudi Arabia to the following persons, namely: ARISTOTLE HILARIO y COLOCADO, ANDRES RAMOS y PEREZ, SOLEDAD TADEO y HILARIO, ROLANDO LAED y TABISOLA, ZOILO RADAN y RODA and RANDI HILARIO y ALCANTARA, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor.

However, only Nelia Coronacion and Eduardo Aquino were apprehended. Accused June Mendez is still at large. Hence, on August 11, 1987, the former were arraigned and each entered a plea of not guilty. 3 Trial on the merits proceeded with respect to them.

ISSUE:

Whether they were guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.

RULING:

YES.

Evidently, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when a person (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 

In the case at bench, the presence of the second and third elements is not disputed. The appellants are neither licensees or holders of any authority from POEA to engage in recruitment and placement activities as evidenced by a certification of the said agency dated September 8, 1987. It was likewise established that the private complainants were unaware of the appellants' lack of authority when they transacted business with them. It was only later, upon inquiry at POEA, that they discovered the appellants' lack of authority. Finally, the number of private complainants, certainly more than three, is beyond dispute.

Now, we resolve whether the first element of the offense of illegal recruitment, i.e., that the appellants undertook any of the recruitment activities defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or any of the prohibited activities defined under Article 34 of the same Code, was successfully established by the prosecution.

To satisfy the first element, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the complainants clearly pointing to the appellants as two of the three persons who promised them employment abroad and who collected and received varying amounts from them. 

PEOPLE vs. VILLANUEVA (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 123010 July 20, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

MAGED T. GHARBIA, MARY G. ALWIRAIKAT and LAILA VILLANUEVA, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Nineteen of the thirty-five complainants, from majority of whom hails from Baguio City were presented by the prosecution to establish the scheme perpetrated by appellant in his illegal recruitment activities. The record shows that Gharbia and Villanueva, who represented themselves as husband and wife, and purportedly doing business under the name and style of Fil-Ger Recruitment Agency with office address at Quezon City, conspired with co-accused Mary Alwiraikat, likewise of Baguio City, in convincing the complainants that employment opportunities as factory workers abound in Taiwan. Allegedly that upon full payment of the prescribed fees which, surprisingly, were exacted in different amounts ranging from P20,000.00 to as high as P48,000.00, the applicants would then be able to fly to Taiwan to commence work thereat.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused were guilty of the crime illegal recruitment by large scale.

RULING:

Yes, The crime of illegal recruitment in large scale requires the concurrence of three elements, viz: That (1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers, defined under Article 13 (b), 5 or in any prohibited activities under Article 34, 6 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to having a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas, and (3) the accused commits the offense against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 

Contrary to appellant's assertions, the prosecution has presented clear and compelling evidence fingering him as one of those who recruited complainants. The illegality of the recruitment was bolstered by the POEA certification whereby Ms. Nenita Mercado attested that neither appellant nor Fil-Ger Recruitment Agency is licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.

On this score, we defer to the findings of the trial court which ruled that while it is true that none of the receipts issued to the complainants was signed by appellant, it is incorrect for him to argue that his indictment was based on such issuance alone. The totality of the evidence shows that appellant took an active and direct part in misrepresenting that they have the authority and the power to facilitate workers' employment abroad.

The testimony of the other complainants substantially corroborate those previously mentioned with respect to appellant's degree of participation in the illegal recruitment charge.

PEOPLE vs. TAN TIONG MENG (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 120835-40 April 10, 1997 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.

TAN TIONG MENG alias "TOMMY TAN", accused-appellant.

FACTS:

The above-named accused by means of false representations that he can secure an employment in Taiwan for Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas as a factory worker induced the latter to entrust to him the amount of P15,000.00, in consideration of the promised employment, but the herein accused, once in possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, with grave abuse of confidence and without fulfilling his promise, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, misapply, misappropriate and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him for the return of the amount, accused herein failed and refused to do so. There were other informations for estafa involving different person.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the informations and all seven (7) cases were tried jointly.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused were guilty of the offense illegal recruitment in large scale  and estafa.

RULING:

YES.

The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thus:

(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 13

It is clear that accused-appellant's acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and representing to said applicants that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and placement under the above provision of the Labor Code.

The Labor Code prohibits any person or entity, not authorized by the POEA, from engaging in recruitment and placement activities thus:

(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code . . . .

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. 14

The POEA having certified that accused-appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, it is clear that the offense committed against the six (6) complainants in this case is illegal recruitment in large scale punishable under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).

Accused-appellant's guilt of six (6) separate crimes of estafa has likewise been proven

The argument that the deceit was employed by Jose Percival Borja and not by accused-appellant is specious, even ridiculous. All the complainants agreed that it was accused-appellant Tan who assured them of jobs in Taiwan. The assurances were made intentionally to deceive the would-be job applicants to part with their money.

In People v. Calonzo, 15 the Court reiterated the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided the elements of the crime are present. In People v. Romero 16 the elements of the crime were stated thus:

a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and

b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.

Both elements have been proven in this case.

PEOPLE vs. BODOZO (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 96621 October 21, 1992 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JOEY BODOZO y BULA, and NIMFA BODOZO y NERI, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

When the accused Nimfa Bodozo was in Luna, La, Union, she told the private complainants, who are simple farmers, and at the time unemployed, that she was recruiting workers for employment in Saudi Arabia and Singapore. The accused Nimfa Bodozo required the five (5) private complainants to submit to her, in addition to their respective applications, NBI clearances and medical certificates in connection with their applications. The private complainants Prudencio Renon and Fernando Gagtan were told by the accused Nimfa Bodozo that their salary in Saudi Arabia was US$200.00 a month, while the accused Nimfa Bodozo assured private complainant, Angelino Obiacoro, Ludovico Gagtan and Domingo Obiacoro that they were going to be paid, by their respective employers, in Singapore, the amount of Singapore 16.00 dollars a day. The private complainant Prudencio Renon and Fernando Gagtan submitted their application forms, duly filled up, passports, their NBI clearances and medical certificates to the accused Nimfa Bodozo in their residence at Quirino Avenue, Manila, Domingo Obiacoro, Angelino Obiacoro and Ludovico Gagtan likewise submitted to the accused their NBI clearances and medical certificates as required by the accused. Moreover, the accused demanded payment to all complainants in connection with the their application for employment abroad.

ISSUE:

Whether Bodozo is guilty of illegal recruitment.

RULING:

Yes, t should be noted that any of the acts mentioned in Article 13 (b) can lawfully be undertaken only by the licensees or holders of authority to engage in the recruitment and placement workers.

The crime of illegal recruitment has two elements:

1 The offender is a non-license or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment or placement of workers; and

2 That the offender undertakes either any recruitment activities defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.

In this case at bar, it is undisputed that accused-appellants Joey Bodozo and Nimfa Bodozo are neither licensed not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

Accused-appellants want this Court to believe that they merely helped private complainants apply for overseas employment. Evidences on record, however, show otherwise. Accused-appellants not only asked private complainants to fill up application forms but also to submit to them their NBI clearances, passports and medical certificates. In addition thereto, accused-appellants collected payment for processing fee and other sundry expenses from private complainants, all which constitutes acts of recruitment within the meaning of the law.

PEOPLE vs. AVENDAÑO (Labor Law Review)

[G.R. Nos. 96277-82. December 2, 1992.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ABELARDO C. AVENDAÑO, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The accused (Abelardo C. Avendaño) is the Treasurer of MCBRAJ Agro-Industrial Development Company (MAINDECO). Carmelito Soriano, Jr. is the President of said Company. Manuel Calanog is the personnel manager.

The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, with accused CARMELITO SORIANO, JR., whose identity and whereabout is not yet known and helping with one another, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad of some 38 workers. 

Six (6) separate informations for Illegal Recruitment of some 38 workers were filed against Avendaño.

Upon arraignment, Avendaño pleaded not guilty to the six (6) informations. 

ISSUE:

Whether Avendaño is guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment .

RULING:

Yes, It is admitted that MAINDECO is not licensed or authorized by the Department of Labor and Employment to engage in recruitment of persons for overseas employment. Consequently, the recruitment activities undertaken by MAINDECO are illegal. Illegal recruitment, when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme, and it is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. (Article 38, paragraphs [a] and [b], Labor Code). The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage. Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority found violating any provision of the Code shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court. If the offender is a corporation, partnership, association or entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership, association or entity responsible for violation. (Article 39, paragraphs [a], [c] and [d], Labor Code.)