ST. MICHAEL'S INSTITUTE vs. Santos (Labor Law Review)

G.R. No. 145280      December 4, 2001

ST. MICHAEL'S INSTITUTE, FR. NICANOR VICTORINO and EUGENIA BLANCO, petitioners, 

vs.

CARMELITA A. SANTOS, FLORENCIO M. MAGCAMIT and ALBERT M. ROSARDA, respondents.

FACTS:

Santos, Magcamit and Rosarda were school faculty only in St. Michael's Institute. Their service with the school was abruptly interrupted when each of them was served a notice of termination of employment.

The termination allegedly stemmed from an incident of a public rally. The rally, organized and participated in by faculty members, parents and some students of petitioner school, was, among others, aimed at calling the attention of the school administration to certain grievances relative to substandard school facilities and the economic demands of teachers and other employees of St. Michael's Institute.

Petitioner Blanco, as school principal, sent each of the respondents identical memoranda requiring them to explain their acts of leading the aforementioned rally of students outside the school premises; preventing students from attending classes; and denouncing the school authority in their speech. Responding to the individual memorandum sent to them, respondents Magcamit and Rosarda, in separate letters dated August 13, 1993, denied all the accusations attributed to them, and explained that they were invited by the core group of parents and merely joined them in expressing their sentiments; that they did not denounce the school authority but, rather, the way it was being misused and abused. On the other hand, respondent Santos, in a letter dated August 16, 1993, justified her actions as having been done "on behalf of her co-teachers with the parents' blessings" to denounce "the administration's corrupt practices more so the school director".

On September 20, 1993, each of the respondents were sent three (3) identical letters informing them of their termination from the service "for serious disrespect" to their superior and for "serious misconduct that resulted in the disruption of classes."

Respondents Magcamit and Rosarda immediately filed on September 21, 1993 a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners. On October 12, 1993, a second complaint for illegal dismissal was filed by respondents Magcamit and Rosarda, this time with respondent Santos. Both complaints were consolidated. Labor Arbiter rendered a joint decision to dismiss the complaints for lack of merit.

NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that the respondents had been illegally dismissed.

Petitioners then brought a petition for certiorari before this Court. 

Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the NLRC but further awarded backwages to respondents. Petitioners sought reconsideration of the said decision but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents were illegaly dismissed. 

RULING:

Yes, in the instant case, the reason basically cited for the dismissal of respondents is serious misconduct or willful disobedience for dereliction of duty predicated on their absence for only one day of classes for attending a public rally and denouncing the school authority. The magnitude of the infraction must be weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed and must be commensurate thereto, in view of the gravity of the penalty of dismissal or termination from the service.

We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that, under the attendant factual antecedents, the dismissal meted out on the respondents for dereliction of duty for one school day and denouncing school authority, appears to be too harsh a penalty. It must be noted that the respondents are being held liable for a first time offense and, in the case of respondent Santos, despite long years of unblemished service. Even when an employee is found to have transgressed the employer's rules, in the actual imposition of penalties upon the erring employee, due consideration must still be given to his length of service and the number of violations committed during his employment. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the employee ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. Moreover, the facts, as further established on appeal in the NLRC, paint out a picture that the respondents were singled out by the petitioners apparently for being officers of the teachers' union which they formed, despite the fact that several other teachers also joined the August 10, 1993 rally.

We reiterate the settled doctrine in termination of employment disputes that the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just and valid cause. Evidence must be clear, convincing and free from any inference that the prerogative to dismiss an employee was abused and unjustly used by the employer to further any vindictive end.

Misconduct is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. As a just cause for termination, the misconduct must be serious, which implies that it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. On the other hand, disobedience, as a just cause for termination, must be willful or intentional. Willfulness is characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude rendering the employee's act inconsistent with proper subordination. Not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-connected order of the employer is reasonably penalized with dismissal. As we have stated, there must be reasonable proportionality between, on the one hand, the willful disobedience by the employee and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed therefor.25 In the instant case, evidence is wanting on the depravity of conduct, and willfulness of the disobedience on the part of the respondents. Absence of one day of work to join a public rally cannot be of such great dimension as to equate it with an offense punishable with the penalty of dismissal. The reinstatement of the respondents is, thus, just and proper.