ARCHES vs. BELLOSILLO (Tax 2)

G.R. No. L-23534             May 16, 1967

JOSE A. ARCHES, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

ANACLETO I. BELLOSILLO and JAIME ARANETA, respondents-appellees.

Jose A. Arches for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Solicitor A.B. Afurong and Atty. S.S. Soriano for respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

Petitioner-appellant Jose Arches filed on February 27, 1954 his income tax return for 1953. Within five years thereafter, or on February 26, 1959, deficiency income tax and residence tax assessments were issued against him.

Said assessments not having been disputed, the Republic represented by the Bureau of Internal Revenue Regional, Director, filed suit on December 29, 1960, in the municipal court of Roxas City, to recover from petitioner-appellant the sum of P4,441.25 as deficiency income tax and additional residence tax for 1953. Arches then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not expressly show the approval of the Revenue Commissioner, as required by Section 308 of the Tax Code, and on the further ground of prescription of the action. 

The municipal court denied the motion. Petitioner-appellant, his motion to reconsider having been denied also, resorted to the Court of First Instance of Capiz on a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the order denying his motion to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the petition. Hence, this appeal

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court is correct in dismissing the case.

RULING:

Yes, assuming, therefore, in gratia argumenti, that the suit is being erroneously — but not invalidly — entertained, for lack of express approval of the Commissioner or the Regional Director, certiorari would still not lie. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and the remedy of the unsuccessful movant is to await the judgment on the merits and then appeal therefrom.7 And, as the Court of First Instance rightly observed, there was no showing of a special reason or urgent need to stop the proceedings at such early stage in the municipal court.

Petitioner-appellant would also raise the question of prescription. Again, this is not jurisdictional. And, We have already ruled that the proper prescriptive period for bringing civil actions is five years from the date of the assessment, under Section 332 of the Tax Code. The three-year period urged by petitioner-appellant under Section 51 (d) refers only to the summary remedies of distraint and levy. Here, the action was commenced one year, ten months and three days after the assessments were made; hence, well within the period.

Wherefore, the dismissal of appellant's petition for certiorari by the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed.