Ledesma vs. CA

 G.R. No. 106646 June 30, 1993

JAIME LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioner.

Meer, Meer & Meer Law Office for private respondent.

FACTS:

On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed Case No. 38287 in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust Receipt Agreement No. 7389 executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which petitioner had failed to comply with. As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 1981.

On December 2, 1988, private respondent bank instituted Civil Case No. 88-2572 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 133, against petitioner on the same cause of action and subject matter.

Petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription which was denied and judgment was rendered in favor of private respondent. Said judgment was affirmed by respondent Court and petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied.

Petitioner's petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was denied  its present motion for reconsideration contending that the second action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed.

ISSUE:

Whether the second action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed.

RULING:

No. The Court ruled that the filing of the first action interrupted the running of the period, and then declared that at any rate, the second action was filed within the balance of the period remaining. 

Article 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

The correct interpretations of Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements in the case of Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways Company.

Article 1155 has been interpreted in both case to mean that upon the cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of prescription commences to run anew. 

Petitioner is wrong in insisting that in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive period is merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period available for the filing of another action. This postulation of petitioner, if we are to adopt it, would result in an absurdity wherein Article 1155 would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the prescriptive period is interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment of a debt, but it is merely tolled where an action is filed in court.

Hence, the present motion is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.