MEDINA vs. KOIKE (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA KOIKE," Petitioner, v. MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore two children.

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Doreen presented several foreign documents to support the petition.

However RTC denied Doreen's petition.

Doreen's motion for reconsideration was denied as well, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

RULING:

It bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

In one of the jurisprudence it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. 

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with this Decision.

REPUBLIC vs. MANALO (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial court's Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that, based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. 

OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, including marriages."

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.

OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether, under Art 26 par 2 of Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. 

RULING:

SC deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

SC affirmed CA decision regarding:

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. 

--------

(SC denied the petition and remanded it for futher proceedings. See ruling below.

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SALIENTES vs. ABANILLA (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,

vs.

LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents

FACTS:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and RTC. It was granted, now the respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before this Court the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari on the ground of among others that the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus.

ISSUE:
Whether habeas corpus is proper remedy in this case.

RULING:
YES. Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9  of A.M. 03-04-04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ELCANO vs HILL (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, 

vs.

REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

A complaint was filed for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

ISSUE:

Is the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has extinguished his liability for quasi-delict.

RULING:

No, the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Here is a clear instance of the act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. 

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under Quasi Delicts/Culpa Aquiliana is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",

Notably, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.

IN THE MATTER OF ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA (Civil Law Review 1)

[G.R. NO. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA 

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner.

FACTS:

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

The trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.

WHEREFORE, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

RULING:

YES. 

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother.

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.

REPUBLIC vs. MOLINA (Civil Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in this case will prosper on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

No, psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The following are the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. 

Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. 

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. 

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. 

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. 

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS (Criminal Law)

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992.

Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. 

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties.

ISSUE:

Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?

RULING:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. 

The following are the rules:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

ROMUALDEZ vs. CA (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. Nos. 165510-33             July 28, 2006

BENJAMIN ("KOKOY") T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, 

vs.

HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as the Ombudsman, and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment4 that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether the offenses for which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.

RULING:

Yes. 

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.21

Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years. Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador22 that:

It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.23

Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.

As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides:

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

BATULANON vs. PEOPLE (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. No. 139857             September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner, 

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

Leonila Batulanon is Cashier/Manager of Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit. 

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors. 

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition. 

ISSUE: 

Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents. 

RULING:

Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. 

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. SC finds that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. 

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.

PEOPLE vs. TABACO (Criminal Law)

People v. Tabaco

G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997

FACTS:

Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena while the  accused Mario Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated when he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of  Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.

Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co’s canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. He tried to pacify Tabaco. Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo,one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena, and saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena.  They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical treatment.

There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints.”

After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision, found accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts.

ISSUES:

Whether the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been prosecuted under only one Information.

RULING:

No.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

‘When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).

Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).

In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its companion offenses.”

Furthermore, the trial court’s reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas is misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.

PEOPLE vs. WATIMAR (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. Nos. 121651-52               August 16, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

FERNANDO WATIMAR, accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Myra Watimar, 20 years old when she took the witness stand, single, farm helper and a resident of Macapsing, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, testified that she is the complainant in the two (2) criminal cases; that she stated that ‘in the evening of March 26, 1990, she slept together with her brothers and sisters, namely: Bernardo, Marilou, Leonardo, Ariel and Lea, without her mother who went to the hospital as her aunt was about to give birth; that her father slept with them in the same room; that at about 2:00 in the early dawn of March 26, 1990, she felt that somebody was on top of her and [was] kissing her neck; that she recognized him to be her father Fernando Watimar, but when she recognized him, her father talked and a knife was pointed at her neck with an instruction that she should not resist, otherwise, she will be killed; that despite the threat of her father, she resisted and told her father not to molest her, because she is his daughter (the witness was crying); that despite the resistance and plea of the daughter, her father went on top of her, removed her panty and placed himself on top of the complaining witness; that he was able to do the bestial act despite the resistance made by kicking him; that after the father succeeded in sexually molesting her on March 26, 1990, she just kept crying in the corner of their house.

That on November 28, 1992, at 10:00 o’clock in the evening while the complaining witness was cooking alone, she was surprised when somebody was at her back who happened to be Fernando Watimar, her father, who suddenly kissed her and pulled her bringing her to the place where they used to sleep; that she resisted and wanted to extricate herself from her father by kicking him, but the accused is stronger than she is; she pleaded to her father not to molest her again but the father did not heed her plea and he again succeeded in having his sexual desire. Contrary to the accusation the father testify that he did not rape the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused is guilty of the crime of rape.

RULING:

Yes.

1. Accused-appellant contention that the victim did not do everything in her power to prevent the assault on her virtue. He argues that the complaining witness admitted that although accused-appellant initially threatened her at knife point, both his hands were free when he finally committed the act. Accused-appellant states that it is inexplicable why she did not seize this opportunity to make good her efforts.

The contention fails to persuade.

The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance, especially where there is intimidation. In fact, physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for her life or personal safety.

2. Accused-appellant next claims that the complete absence of any medical finding or examination which would directly contribute to establish that rape was indeed committed is a point too glaring to be ignored in the light of the fact that the complainant allowed more than two (2) years to pass before filing the case.

The argument is likewise unpersuasive.

A medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction for rape is proper.

3. Accused-appellant further points out that his characterization as being a good father and husband by his wife, Isabelita Watimar.

This claim deserves short shrift.

Suffice it to state that no young and decent woman would publicly admit that she was ravished and her virtue defiled unless such was true for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor.

4. Accused-appellant, lastly, faults the complainant for tarrying for three (3) long years before telling her mother about his nefarious conduct despite ‘countless’ opportunities to seek the aid of her mother and other relatives.

The contention deserves scant consideration.

Court has consistently held that delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of physical violence cannot be taken against the victim. A rape victim’s action is oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than reason. It is fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build up a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim to silence and submissiveness.

---

The two acts complained of in this case were committed in 1990 and 1992, respectively, at which time Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provided:

ART. 335. When and how rape committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force and intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

PEOPLE vs AGUILOS (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, Appellant.

FACTS:

Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisas store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselitos intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselitos neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot.

The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether there is conspiracy and all acted direct participation in commission of crime.

RULING:

YES. 

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.

In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.

All things considered, SC ruled that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.

Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially thereto.

The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove.

PEOPLE vs. ANCHETA (Criminal Law Review)

G.R. Nos. 138306-07. December 21, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SPO1 EDUARDO ANCHETA Y RODIGOL, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The main witness for the prosecution, Jonathan Aromin, testified that on the night of 2 September 1993 he and his neighbor Julian Ancheta went to the house of the accused who lived just across them.  Julian told Jonathan to knock on the door first but when no one answered Julian did the knocking himself. When the accused opened the door, Jonathan immediately noticed that SPO1 Ancheta was armed with a gun. Intimidated, Jonathan began to move away. As he left the house of the accused, Jonathan suddenly heard two (2) shots which prompted him to hide behind the nearest wall. But when he looked back the accused SPO1 Ancheta was already aiming his revolver directly at his face and without hesitation shot him at close range.  Stunned by the gunshot wound, Jonathan momentarily blacked out but soon regained consciousness when his neighbor, Leonila Lopez, came to his aid and rushed him to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center. 

Leonila Lopez narrated that her house was right across the house of the accused, separated only by a narrow alley.  At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 2 September 1993 while she was preparing dinner, she was startled by the sound of two (2) gunshots coming from the house of the accused. She immediately told her children to go inside and as she was about to close her windows she saw Jonathan Aromin running towards her house, followed by the accused. She then saw the accused shoot Jonathan Aromin on the right cheek. After the accused left, she helped the hapless victim and brought him to the hospital. She was approximately a meter away when she witnessed the shooting. 

The defense of accused-appellant is that the death of Julian Ancheta and the injury of Jonathan Aromin were caused by the accidental gunshots which occurred when he and the deceased grappled for the gun. Thus, absent any intent to kill the victims, he could not be convicted of homicide or murder.

On the other hand, Jonathan Aromin sustained a gunshot wound on his right cheek which would have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention. Based on the number of bullet wounds and the location of the injuries sustained by the victims it is quite impossible to believe that such wounds were caused by two (2) accidental gunshots which ensued while the accused and the deceased wrestled for the gun. 

ISSUE:

Whether the accused is guilty of Murder.

RULING:

No, although SC affirm the factual findings of the trial court on the presence of "intent to kill," the SC believes that the killing of Julian Ancheta and the shooting of Jonathan Aromin were not qualified by treachery.

While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses never saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see the commencement of the assault and the importance of such testimonies cannot be overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere suppositions. And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, treachery can in no way be established. Hence, without the existence of treachery accused-appellant can only be convicted of homicide.

Neither was treachery established in the shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Both these circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.

PEOPLE vs. ESCOTE (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 140756. April 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic Arroyo of Sto. Nio, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star Passenger Bus drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants, rubber shoes, hats and jackets. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service gun. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop the drivers seat to monitor any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.

The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror towards the passengers seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired his gun upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward. Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables.

Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898.3 Juan and Victor took the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo. The police officer pleaded for mercy: Pare maawa ka sa akin : May pamilya ako. However, Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. 

The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow their instructions, he will not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico, Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.

When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the incident to the police authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether treachery is generic aggravating circumstance in a crime of robbery with homicide.

RULING:

Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated September 11, 1878, the word homicide is used in its broadest and most generic sense.

The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.

In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard days work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.

PEOPLE vs. MANTALABA (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 186227               July 20, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.

ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165.

Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In its Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Thus, the present appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether privileged of mitigating circumstance of minority can be availed of.

RULING:
YES.
The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code31 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,32 the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

x x x x

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. 

PEOPLE vs. SARCIA (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 169641               September 10, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs.

RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA’s father filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.

The facts was culled from the record that on December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.

Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them.

Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.

[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellant’s dastardly act. 

ISSUE:

Whether the penalty for the crime of rape be mitigated because of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.

RULING:

Yes. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.

However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

Llave vs. PEOPLE (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. No. 166040               April 26, 2006

NIEL F. LLAVE, Petitioner, 

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

An Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape of another minor Debbielyn (7 years old).

Petitioner, pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp post. She resisted to no avail. Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her. She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina. He kissed her. She felt pain and cried. 

Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:

Whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the crime; 

RULING:

Yes.

Petitioner’s arguments are bereft of merit. 

Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act. On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.

In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.

The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee contest. At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.

In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment.

RAZON vs. PEOPLE (Criminal Law Review 1)

G.R. NO. 158053              June 21, 2007

EDWIN RAZON y LUCEA, Petitioner, 

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

PO1 Francisco Chopchopen (Chopchopen) was walking towards Upper Pinget Baguio City, at around midnight of August 1, 1993, when a taxicab driven by Edwin Razon y Lucea (Razon) stopped beside him. Razon told Chopchopen that he was held up by three men at Dreamland Subdivision. Chopchopen then asked Razon to go with him to the place of the incident to check if the persons who held him up were still there. Razon was hesitant at first but eventually went with Chopchopen. While walking, Chopchopen noticed a person lying on the ground and partially hidden by a big stone. Upon closer look, Chopchopen saw that the person's shirt was soaked in blood and that he was hardly breathing. Chopchopen asked Razon to help him bring the person to the hospital. On the way, Chopchopen asked Razon if he was the one who stabbed the victim. Razon answered no. Soon they met a police mobile patrol driven by SPO2 Samuel Bumangil (Bumangil) who followed them to Baguio General Hospital. The victim, who was later identified as Benedict Kent Gonzalo (Gonzalo), was pronounced dead on arrival. He was 23 years old and a polio victim.

Upon questioning, Razon told Bumangil that he was held up by three men, which included Gonzalo whom he stabbed in self-defense. Razon brought out a fan knife and told Bumangil that it was the knife he used to stab Gonzalo. A later search of the cab however yielded another weapon, a colonial knife with bloodstains which was found under a newspaper near the steering wheel. At the police station, Razon admitted having stabbed Gonzalo but insisted that he did so in self-defense.

Not finding credence in Razon's claim of self-defense, RTC of Baguio City convicted him of homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner acted in self-defense.

RULING:

NO.

Here, petitioner admitted having inflicted the wound which killed Gonzalo. The burden is therefore on him to show that he did so in self-defense. As correctly found by the RTC, however, petitioner failed to prove the elements of self-defense.

To escape liability, the person claiming self-defense must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or at least any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression.

The condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense is the element of unlawful aggression. There can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof and not just a threatening or intimidating attitude. In case of threat, it must be offensive, strong and positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. For a person to be considered the unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to have exhibited external acts clearly showing his intent to cause and commit harm to the other.

In this case, petitioner unequivocally admitted that after the three men went out of his taxicab, he ran after them and later went back to his cab to get his colonial knife; then he went down the canal to swing his knife at the victim, wounding and killing him in the process. Such can no longer be deemed as self-defense.

It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 12245-R, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Edwin Razon y Lucea" is AFFIRMED.