Lina vs Cariño (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW)

G.R. No. 100127. April 23, 1993.

JOSE D. LINA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ISIDRO D. CARINO, in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, respondents. 

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed by petitioner Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr., principally as taxpayer, against respondent Isidro D. Cariño, in the latter's capacity as the then Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports ("DECS"). Petitioner disputes the legal authority of respondent Cariño to issue DECS Order No. 30, series of 1991, dated 11 March 1991, entitled "Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private Schools, Colleges and Universities for School Year 1991-1992." DECS Order No. 30 allows private schools to increase tuition and other school fees, subject to the guidelines there set out. The complete text of DECS Order No. 30 is reproduced here for ready reference.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether DECS Order No. 30 is valid, that is, whether respondent DECS Secretary has the legal authority to issue DECS Order No. 30 prescribing guidelines concerning increases in tuition and other school fees: and

RULING:

Having concluded that under B.P. Blg. 232 the collection and application or use of tuition and other school fees are subject only to the limitations under the rules and regulations issued by the Ministry, the crucial point now shifts to the said implementing rules." 11 (Emphasis supplied)

Secondly, an examination of the precise language of Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 232 shows that there is really nothing in Section 42 which must be read as eliminating the power of the DECS Secretary in respect of the fixing of maximum tuition and other school fees vested in him by P.D. No. 451. Under Section 42, a private school may determine for itself in the first instance the rate of tuition and other school fees or charges that it deems appropriate. Such determination by the private school is not, however, binding and conclusive as against the secretary of Education, Culture and Sports. The rates and charges adopted by such private school "shall be collectible, and their application or use authorized" provided that such rates and charges are in accord with rules and regulations promulgated by the DECS.

It is convenient to quote Section 42 again:

"Sec. 42. Tuition and Other School Fees. — Each Private school shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. The rates and charges adopted by schools pursuant to this provision shall be collectible, and their application or use authorized, subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports." (Emphasis supplied).

We do not read the first sentence of Section 42 as granting an unlimited power to private schools to establish any rate of tuition and other school fees and charges that it may desire and to enforce collection of such fees or charges from students. We think it entirely clear that the second sentence of Section 42 is a limiting provision, that is, a provision which, far from authorizing a private school to adopt any level of tuition and other school fees or charges no matter how exorbitant, subjects the schedule of rates and charges adopted by a particular school to the rules and regulations promulgated by the DECS. Thus, the rates and charges adopted by any given private school shall be "collectible". i.e., enforceable against the students and their parents, to the extent that they are consistent with DECS rules and regulations. Put a little differently, the second sentence of Section 42 deals with two (2) distinguishable subjects: (a) the enforceability of rates of fees and charges adopted by private schools: and (b) the enforceability of proposed applications or uses of tile proceeds of such school fees or charges — and both are declared subject to rules and regulations promulgated by the DECS.

We turn to the argument of petitioner Lina that the DECS Secretary was divested of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the fixing of tuition and other school fees, by R.A. No. 6728, and that such authority has been transferred instead to the SAC. The Court is unable to agree with this contention. We do not see how R.A. No. 6728 could be regarded as vesting upon the SAC the legal authority to establish maximum permissible tuition and other school fees for private schools. As earlier noted, R.A. No. 6728 deals with government assistance to students and teachers in private schools; it does not, in other words, purport to deal at all with the question of authority to fix maximum collectible tuition and other school fees. R.A. No, 6728 did authorize the SAC to issue rules and regulations; but the rules and regulations which may be promulgated by the SAC must relate to the authority granted by R.A. No. 6728 to the SAC. It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with, the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid. 12 The SAC was authorized to define the classes of students who may be entitled to claim government financial assistance. Under the statute, students of schools charging tuition and other school fees in excess of certain identified rates or levels thereof shall not be entitled to claim government assistance or subsidies. The specification of such levels of tuition and other school fees for purposes of qualifying (or disqualifying) the students in such schools for government financial assistance is one thing; this is the task SAC was authorized to carry out though the promulgation of rules and regulations. The determination of the levels of tuition and other school fees which may lawfully be charged by any private school, is clearly another matter; this task is vested in respondent Secretary.

It is hardly necessary to add that the Court, in reaching the above conclusion, is not saying that every paragraph and sub-paragraph of DECS Order No. 30 is necessarily valid and consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute(s). We do not understand the parties to be asking us to validate or strike down every such paragraph and sub-paragraph.

In respect of the second principal issue, petitioner Lina contends that Section 1(d) of DECS Order No. 30 is inconsistent with Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728. We have earlier pointed out that petitioner's stand is inconsistent with the very language used in Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 which states in relevant part that: "in any proposed increase in the rate of tuition fees, there shall be appropriate consultations —." Petitioner Lina's argument here is, however, essentially an invocation of "justice and equity." Petitioner argues that:

". . . [T]here is no basis, legal or otherwise, for the respondent Secretary to view 'other fees' as separate and distinct from 'tuition fee rate' for purposes of the consultation requirement of the law. To exclude the imposition of 'other fees' from the consultation process would result in an anomalous situation whereby so-called 'other fees' may become so burdensome that the students and parents concerned may be deprived of the right of being heard or consulted on matter directly affecting their interest. Justice and equity demand that any increase in the tuition fee, tuition fee assessment or 'other fees' which in its totality increases the cost of education, should and must be subjected to consultation, as required in Section 10, R.A. No. 6728." 13 (Emphasis supplied).

The Court believes that petitioner's argument — cogent though it may be as a social and economic comment — is most appropriately addressed. not to a court which must take the law as it is actually written, but rather to the legislative authority which can, if it wishes, change the language and content of the law. As Section 10 of R.A. No. 6728 now stands, we have no authority to strike down paragraph 1 (d) of DECS Order No. 30 as inconsistent with the requirements of Section 10.

Summarizing, the first issue we must answer in the affirmative. To the second issue, we must give a negative answer.