People vs Dacuycuy (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW)

G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.

The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:

On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative department of the Government.

1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:

Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).

ISSUE:

Whether section 32 or RA 4670 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

The respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.

Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.

On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.