URC vs LLDA (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW)

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), Petitioner, - versus - LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 191427 Present: CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, JR., and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: May 30, 2011

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

         FACTS:

Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDAs order justified such recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial action.

         ISSUE:

Whether the exhaustion of administrative remedy is needed in this case.

RULING:

Yes, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.[10]The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.[11]

Executive Order No. 192[12] (EO 192) was issued on June 10, 1987 for the salutary purpose of reorganizing the DENR, charging it with the task of promulgating rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land pollution as well as of promulgating ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations. EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator for determining reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.[13]

Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.

As for petitioners invocation of due process, it fails too. The appellate court thus aptly brushed aside this claim, in this wise:

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

. . . Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

Here, petitioner URC was given ample opportunities to be heard it was given show cause orders and allowed to participate in hearing to rebut the allegation against it of discharging pollutive wastewater to the Pasig River, it was given the chance to present evidences in support of its claims, it was notified of the assailed Order to Pay, and it was allowed to file a motion for reconsideration. Given these, we are of the view that the minimum requirements of administrative due process have been complied with in this case.[14](emphasis in the original)